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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Context of analysis 
 
The last decade of the Soviet Union witnessed unprecedented sociological and 
political change following the advent of Mikhail Gorbechev’s policies of glasnost and 
perestroika.  Shifting tectonic plates of political opportunities provided the space for 
social movements to emerge that were critical of the status quo for the first time.  The 
birth of political toleration allowed public acknowledgement that Soviet 
industrialisation had led to widespread environmental degradation and catastrophe – 
and an environmental movement emerged which opposed it. 
 
The cultural and scientific intelligentsia inside and outside of the USSR had long 
critiqued the incompatibility of Soviet socialism in practice with that of socialism in 
theory, both on human and ecological grounds.  Aside from elite criticism, thousands 
of ordinary Soviet citizens were becoming increasingly intolerant of the environmental 
degradation experienced in their workplaces and local communities.  Famously, the 
social and environmental effect of the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power 
station in 1986, 5km from the model Soviet town of Pripyat, represented a nadir for 
those who insisted that Soviet industrialisation was in harmony with people and 
planet.  The breadth and magnitude of environmental problems fuelled a broad 
Green movement that could finally voice its concerns as a result of relaxed levels of 
political repression (French 1990: 28).  In the space of a decade, environmental 
activism emerged from the underground, forming an integral part of the kaleidoscopic 
political landscape emerging across the USSR.  
 
1.2 Purpose of analysis  
 
This dissertation will seek to account for the rise of the Green movement within the 
Soviet Union in the context of its changing social structure exhibited throughout the 
1980’s.  It will attempt to explain why this movement emerged when it did and how it 
did in the context of the Soviet political and social system, using a theoretical 
framework that considers both structural and agency-orientated factors. 
 
James Caspell 
Page 4 of 39 
This evaluation will exhibit how structural environments affect social movements and 
how changes to the political opportunity structure give rise to their emergence.  Like 
all social movements, the Soviet Green movement owed its emergence to the 
coalescence of several causal factors.  System-wide structural changes, the 
emergence of a collective environmental conscience as well as the ability of the 
movement to seize political opportunities through the mobilisation of activists and 
resources, all require analysis.  The task of this dissertation is to recognise all 
relevant factors which acted as both causes and catalysts of the Green movement, 
and to attribute relevant analytical weight to each. 
 
1.2 Methodology and structure 
 
McAdam et al. (1996) and Foweraker (1995) discuss the utility of various sociological 
traditions, providing an understanding of the dynamic nature of social movements in 
their construction rather than present them simply as static, passive entities within 
respective political environments.  This dissertation will adopt a similarly dynamic 
analysis; a summary of theoretical frameworks will precede the specific analysis of 
the structural and agency-orientated causes of the Soviet Green movement. 
 
I will evaluate the historical structure of the Soviet Union and how this changed 
during the period relevant to the emergence of many social movements, including the 
Green movement.  However, underlying these societal changes exists at a more 
micro level the dynamics where the movement came into existence, forming a 
recognisable niche in Soviet political society.  A structural analysis alone could 
superficially homogenise the causal factors of the Green movement with those of 
other movements that occurred in the 1980’s, such as the women’s, nationalist and 
trade union movements.  Therefore, I will also seek to identify the relevance of 
factors pertinent to the Green movement that defined its social construction, such as 
the agency of collective actors.  I will use qualitative and quantitative data to identify 
the root and branch causes of the Green movement, how and why it varied across 
the Republics and how it manifested itself both within and without the conventional 
channels of political power.  As such, I will investigate cases of environmental 
degradation and emergency that led to widespread environmental concern, the 
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emergence of groups, electoral performance and mass protest relating to 
environmental issues.   
 
I will primarily use literature from the period in question prior to the Soviet collapse as 
it will better explain the reasons for the emergence of Green politics from within the 
sociological framework, rather than literature clouded by the collapse of the USSR as 
a social, economic and political system.  The dissertation will not focus on the 
outcomes of the Soviet Green movement per se, nor the effect that the collapse of 
the USSR had on the movement.   Rather, I simply seek to emphasise the existence 
and growth of a discernible Green social movement within the USSR in the 1980’s 
and to provide a thorough explanation for its causal factors. 
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2. Analysing social movements - a theoretical framework 
 
It is arguably the case that social movements emerge dynamically, embedded within 
structural environments, but also because of context and agency specific factors.   
Whilst a range of theories exist to explain why social movements emerge that may 
prima facie appear contradictory, I will argue that there is some causal significance in 
several theories and the validity of each is by no means mutually exclusive to the 
utility of others. 
 
When seeking to identify a ‘social movement’, there is some consensus of the 
prerequisite conditions across various sociological schools.  It must embody a 
collective identity, harbour one or a number of grievances concerning the existing 
political society, demonstrate a capacity to carry out collective action and entwined 
with a broader group of structural, contextual factors commonly known as the political 
opportunity structure (Klandermans 1997: 2; Oberschall, 1996: 94). Social 
movements represent ‘collective challenges by people with common purposes,’ 
interacting with political elites and authorities (Tarrow 1998: 4).  However, acting 
‘collectively’ is not the monopoly of social movements (ibid.: 3).  What segregates 
social movements from other contentious political entities is their potential to mobilise 
and exhibit a readiness to act collectively (Gamson 1975: 15).  By its very nature, a 
social movement is a dynamic and active political body rather than a static, 
responsive entity.   
 
Social movements exhibit mobilisation through ‘unconventional’ political strategies 
and the threat of social change to displace dominant political elites and structures 
(Scott 1990: 6).  They are intrinsically political as they are motivated by the objective 
of not simply changing the norms and values existent within a society, but to also 
influence law-making agendas and threaten the existing political order (Tilly 1999: 
257; McAdam 1988: 128).  However, whilst social movements are dynamic, they are 
also subject to the changing structural situations in a political society (Klandermans 
1997: 6).  This is no more evident than in the structural change which gave rise to the 
Soviet Green movement in the 1980’s. 
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2.1 Political Opportunity Structures 
According to Tarrow, history suggests that whilst there tend to be common factors 
that unite social movements in their causation in different societies, what does vary is 
the level and type of opportunity that social movements are afforded, the constraints 
on their freedom of action and the threats they perceive to their interests and 
objectives (1994: 71).  Kitschelt concurs that a society’s political opportunity structure 
is the most useful explanation for the comparative difference between the emergence 
and success of different social movements (1986).   
As Kitschelt surmises, political opportunity structures, 
 ‘[…] are comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional 
arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilisation, which 
facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and 
constrain them in others.’ (1986: 58).   
Such structures define the environment in which a movement is forced to operate, 
but more pertinently the likelihood of any movement emerging in the first instance.  
Thus political opportunity environments shape both the possibility of a movement and 
the tangibility that the changes advocated can be realised (ibid.: 63).   The openness 
of a political system, the number of groups in which power is vested and the extent to 
which power is decentralised all comprise the political opportunity environment.  
Such factors coagulate to define the extent to which a political environment may 
facilitate or impede social movements.   
The nature of political traditions and structures within a regime, as well as internal 
and external interactions across state boundaries, also play a role in outlining political 
opportunity structures.  The emergence of social groups is often determined by the 
level of organisation of preceding forms of social association (McAdam et al. 1988: 
703).  Therefore, movements do not always emerge simply because individuals 
choose to join a struggle.  Rather established groups can redefine grievances and 
group membership in order to include commitment to new causes (Friedman and 
McAdam 1992: 163).  Pre-existing social networks provide the blueprint against 
which movements emerge, articulating new and outstanding grievances (Foweraker 
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1995: 12).  Global shifts in perceptions and knowledge, often because of events such 
as the Chernobyl disaster, also provide new opportunities within political societies 
(Tarrow 1998: 10; Hopkins 1993: 53).  Many Soviet commentators felt that, “the time 
[had] come to set up a party on the basis of the ideology common to all Greens in the 
various countries of the world” (Hlazovy 1989: 2). Such shifts and events also play a 
key role in exacerbating existing grievances, and therefore induce a greater 
propensity for agency.  One of the main causes of collective mobilisation is often the 
exacerbation of pre-existing grievances, a hypothesis that this dissertation will 
support concerning the Soviet Green movement. 
The development of political consciousnesses driving social movements is often 
determined by the level of repression within a political environment (See Lipset 1983: 
2; Geary 1981; Marks 1989).  Tilly defines repression as, “any action by another 
group which raises the contenders’ cost of collective action” (1978: 100).  Different 
modes of repression have stunted and elicited social movements throughout history.  
Meanwhile, the centralisation of the ideological state apparatus, as existed in the 
Soviet Union, provides less scope for shifting alliances, manoeuvre and fragmented 
elites that could be exploited.  Toqueville wrote, alluring to the idea that groups act on 
opportunities, that “the most perilous moment for a […] government is […] when it 
seeks to mend its own ways” (1955: 176-7).  There is no doubt that social 
movements are affected by their political environment, none more so than the Green 
movement in the Soviet Union where political opportunities were emerging for the 
first time.  of its own volition, the Soviet elite created the opportunities for the Green 
movement and other movements to emerge.   
2.2 The role of collective consciousness 
Analysis of political opportunity structures alone arguably only explains how a 
movement can emerge and not necessarily why it emerged.  Social movements are 
also affected by many micro issues, such as their ability to mobilise resources, and 
macro issues, such as the economic and social forces which cause social conflict 
and grievances in the first place.   
Adopting a Marxist analysis, the emergence of social movements, such as the  
labour movement, is fuelled by the development of collective consciousness (See, for 
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example, Lukács 1968). The political environment defines a movement’s relative 
success, but not the reasons for its existence in the first instance; “The  history of all 
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle” (Marx 1848: 1).  For Marxists, 
social movements are linked to a materialist discourse dependent on the inherent 
contradictions of a given economic system that make its dismantling inevitable.  Such 
an analysis, if accurate, is far more relevant in identifying root causation than levels 
of parliamentary openness and pluralism.  It can be argued that all modern social 
movements can in some way be entwined to the alienation, exploitation and 
immiseration caused by a capitalist mode of production.  The manifestation that 
movements take in respective societies represents merely their subjective 
construction, rather than their objective motivations and root causes.  Even Kitschelt 
– a non-Marxist – identifies the emergence of the anti-nuclear movement in the 
Western world as being in response to the burgeoning bureaucracy and 
technological control that has increasingly regulated social life in late capitalism 
(1986: 58).  Social cleavages could also be identified in supposedly ‘communist’ 
states, which many theorists have analysed as being ‘state capitalist’ and therefore 
riddled with a similar class dynamic as that between the proletariat and bourgeoisie 
in capitalist states (Singleton 1976: xvi; Marcy 1990: 267-276; Cliff 1955).  
2.3 Social construction, micromobilisation and framing processes 
Whilst a structural approach is relevant in an objective sense, such an approach on 
its own does not explain the comparative differences between different social 
movements in terms of varying emergence and articulation of grievances.  A 
dependency on political opportunities and consciousness does not consider the role 
of mobilisation of resources and activists within a social movement (Tarrow 1986: 
77).  A more nuanced understanding of the role of political environments and the 
development of agency, interaction and micromobilisation within them proves is often 
salient. 
Klandermans (1997: 5) argues that the collective identities within social movements 
are the result of the psycho-sociological interactions between individuals who share 
similar experiences and personal identities.  However as Langlois (2001) suggests, 
the collective interests of a social movement do not always mirror the sum of 
personal interests, which may vary amongst its constituencies.  In the context of the 
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Soviet Green movement, the intelligentsia, workers, peasants and scientists often 
held overlapping but also separate reasons for supporting the collective identify of 
the movement – mirroring the emergent structure within Soviet society. 
Aside from through empirical experiences and discrete interests, social identities are 
formed by the framing context in which people live and operate (Snow et al. 1986: 
464; Tarrow 1998: 2).  The ‘micromobilisation’ context is the specific local setting in 
which processes of collective common interests combine with forms of local 
organisation (McAdam 1988:135).  Analysing micromobilisation provides scope to 
identify potential incentives for the formation of social movements that encourage 
collective action, such as geographical proximity, frame alignment and how 
interaction amongst members produces loyalty associations on a political and 
personal level, strengthening collective consciousness (ibid.: 137; Snow and Benford, 
1988).  
 
Social movements are often incubated within the micro arena, providing a favourable 
setting for the construction of common identities and collective mobilisation 
(Foweraker 1995:12; Snow and Benford, 1988: 194).  Such framing localities are not 
independent of their political and social contexts; social movements at local levels 
still represent the class cleavages, deprivation and, relevant to this dissertation, 
ecological imbalance evident through society.  However, factors relevant to particular 
localities can shape the organisation and mobilisation of different constituent groups 
across regions within a particular movement – a crucial factor in explaining the 
relative differences within a movement. 
 
2.4 Structure versus agency? 
 
As Carlsnaes states, “the agency-structure problem…has at present evolved into 
what is often claimed to constitute the central problem in social and political theory” 
(1992: 245).  Structuralists tend to see the agent merely as a ‘role-player’ who is 
subject to the internalisation of society’s norms and values through socialisation; 
“people’s own reasons, accounts, justifications, and so on, play no part,” (Layder, 
1994: 22).  Such rigidity is identifiable in orthodox Marxist and functionalist accounts 
of the emergence of social movements.  In contrast, the likes of Kitschelt use variants 
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of rational choice theory, such as the strategic choice model, to explain how actors 
seek to maximise their own interests.  Agency centred accounts tend to portray that 
“external structures [do not] play any part in the conduct of social life” (Layder, 1994: 
52).  Thus, traditional approaches tend to adopt an analysis based entirely on 
structure or agency, presenting them as mutually exclusive alternatives.  However 
many sociologists, including post-modernists and neo-Marxists, acknowledge that 
both structure and agency contribute to a holistic social analysis.  For example, 
Gidden’s structuration theory replaces the perceived dualism of structure and agency 
with a ‘duality of structure’:  
 
“By the duality of structure I mean that social structures are both 
constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time they are the very 
medium of this constitution” (Giddens 1976: 121; original emphasis).  
 
It is therefore entirely possible to identify a social constructivist causation relevant to 
the emergence of the Soviet Green movement – including both structural causes, 
and those elements of collective agency that coalesced to provide for its emergence.  
The task will be to identify those causes and catalysts that are primary, and those 
that are secondary.  All such theoretical questions are context specific, and this 
dissertation will draw on them where relevant in order to identify and explain the 
plethora of causal factors beneath the emergence of the Green movement in the 
Soviet Union. 
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3. The Structural Context – Glasnost, Perestroika and Demokratizatsiia 
 
No explanation of the numerous emergent Soviet social movements would be 
complete without discussion of the changing structural context which created the 
political opportunities for such movements to arise.  Indeed, the most prominent 
sociological phenomenon that arose from Gorbachev’s reformist policies of glasnost 
and perestroika was the rise of these social movements (Butterfield and Sedatis 
1991: 1).  This time of ‘openness’ and ‘restructuring’ was in stark contrast to the 
repression that ephemeral pressure groups had endured  under Stalin onwards 
(Barnett 1988: 55-59; Matthews 1978: 147-157).  By the end of the 1980’s, a range of 
groups had come to wrestle policy making initiative away from Communist 
apparatchiks, and even the reformist leadership that had created such opportunities 
in the first instance (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 1).  The alteration of the 
opportunity structure can be analysed in two parts: firstly the advent of glasnost, and 
secondly the introduction of competitive elections for the first time in the USSR. 
 
3.1 Glasnost and Perestroika 
 
Until the advent of glasnost and perestroika the emergence of the Green movement 
remained insignificant.  Encumbered with an institutional memory of repression 
despite previous promises of ‘reform’ under Khrushchev, Brezhnev et al., Green-
minded groups were originally cautious of appearing overtly critical of the Soviet 
regime (Gorbachev 1987: 69).  However, between April 1985 and July 1987, the 
number and variety of “informal”1 groups comprising new social movements was 
noticeably expanding (Smelser, 1988: 695 – 737); by January 1988 estimates neared 
30,000 of such informal groups (Shenin 1988: 3) and by 1989, this number had 
doubled (Pravda, February 10th 1989: 1).   Though the reliability of such data is 
questionable, given the absence of scientifically verified figures, the trends indicated 
both by official and informal sources, inside and outside of the USSR, display a huge 
increase in social movement activity throughout the glasnost period (Butterfield and 
Sedatis 1991: 1).   
 
                                                 
1 The official name for the movement groups comprising social movements, in contrast to “official” 
groups such as local Soviets and Communist Parties. 
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Glasnost was introduced alongside perestroika, the general policy of restructuring, in 
the months immediately following Gorbachev’s selection as Communist Party 
General Secretary in May 1985 (Suny 1998: 451-453).  Gorbachev had publicly 
criticised the social and economic stagnation that had taken place in the 1970’s and 
1980’s, and sought to reinvigorate all aspects of Soviet society.  He  persuaded 
Soviet elites that true ‘restructuring’ could not take place without direct social input, 
and that no one was better placed to lead the changes required in Soviet society than 
Soviet citizens themselves (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 4).  Therefore, the 
collective interests that had for so long been suppressed, including the collective 
voice of the environmental movement, were incubated and liberated by the 
introduction of glasnost (ibid.: 4). 
 
Relatively uncensored exposure of Stalin’s crimes in the state media along with an 
increase in toleration of protests led by radical groups such as the Democratic Union, 
served to provide important information to social movements that the political 
opportunity structure now existed to make public their grievances (Harvey 2000: 
345).  It became increasingly clear that environmentalists would be able to mobilise 
unhindered by the state machinery, signposting new political opportunities 
(Zumbrunnen 1992: 206; Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 4). 
 
Informal environmental groups initially remained outside of the official processes of 
political participation, at least until alternative parties to the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union were tolerated (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 1).  However, in being 
allowed to confront the status quo and challenge existent societal norms and values, 
informal environmental groups became increasingly successful in influencing the 
agenda-setting process both centrally and locally.  Environmental groups increasingly 
succeeded in co-opting official state organisations and even replacing them in the 
role of setting the policy agenda (See Jenkins and Klandeermans 1995).   
 
3.2 Demokratizatsiia – The introduction of competitive elections  
 
In 1989, the opportunities for social movements again expanded, through the 
introduction of competitive elections at local, regional and republican levels; the 
creation of opportunities for the Green movement was again at the initiative of 
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Gorbachev and Communist Party reformers.    At a Central Committee plenary in 
January 1987, Gorbachev announced a new maxim with which he wanted to 
revolutionise the Soviet Union: demokratizatsiia (democratisation).  Despite initial 
elite opposition, in June 1988, Gorbachev again pushed the agenda of 
democratisation, arguing that greater representation and accountability was 
necessary in the Soviet system, allowing Soviet citizens to pick competent and 
responsive leaders rather than Party careerists (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 5).  
 
Gorbachev and his advisors sought to redefine the very understanding of interest 
representation in Soviet society.  Reformist advisors close to Gorbachev, such as 
Tatiana Zaslavskaia, openly claimed that the traditional view of Soviet society no 
longer applied.  Historically, the Communist Party had held that there existed two 
classes in Soviet society – workers and peasants – with one stratum – the 
intelligentsia (Littlejohn 1984: 36-40; Parkin 1972: 149; Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 
5).  However, Gorbachev, Zaslavskaia and others argued for democratisation on the 
basis that such a view no longer represented the modern Soviet Union, highlighting 
that thousands of interest groups, at local and national level, were now conflicting 
with one another with no representative outlet (Soviet Sociology, 1988: 7-27).  As 
such, in 1988 Gorbachev emphasised that a restructured political system was 
required to adequately represent all such interests, including environmental 
grievances (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 5).  Democratisation, “was the chief 
guarantee of the irreversibility [of perestroika]” (Aganbegyan 1989: 165). 
 
By 1989, Gorbachev had quelled opposition to democratisation and pushed through 
the constitutional amendments that provided the legal basis for competitive elections 
for the first time in the USSR (Izvestiia, December 4, 1988: 1-3).  The Supreme 
Soviet, which had previously consisted of 1,500 members and convened just twice a 
year for three or four day sessions, was replaced with a bi-cameral parliamentary 
system.  The new lower house, the Congress of People’s Deputies was a 2,250 
member body that would meet twice yearly for several weeks at a time.  The 
Congress would now select 450 of its own members for the newly comprised 
Supreme Soviet, which would meet twice a year for several months at a time.  The 
new format allowed for greater formal and informal discussion of policy, and for 
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greater democratic deliberation and participation in the decision-making process at a 
national level (See Chainikov 1990: 3-10; Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 12).   
 
However, the fundamental electoral change in priming the political opportunity 
structure was the tolerance of candidates to run against the Communist Party.  By 
October 1990, Pravda reported that 11,000 informal organisations and 20 alternative 
political parties had fielded candidates since the advent of competitive elections 
(Lane 1990: 122).  The historic elections of March 1989 therefore saw Deputies 
elected, with many environmental activists elected as candidates representing 
environmental social movements.   In Ukraine, the leader of Zelenyi Svit (Green 
World), Iurii Shcherbak, was elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 on 
almost an exclusively environmental ticket.  “Ecological Initiatives”, an organisation of 
young doctors, engineers and students in the city of Dneprodzerzhinsk also 
succeeded in having one of their activists elected to Congress.  The Latvian Popular 
Front, which included several environmentalists, won 26 out of 34 seats contested 
whilst the equivalent informal group in Lithuania – Sajudis – claimed 34 of 42 seats 
(Komjaunimo Tiesa, March 29, 1989).  According to the Soviet Weekly New Times, 
the elections of 1989 saw 300 “ecologically minded” Deupties elected, some 15 per 
cent of the total (Lane 1990: 216). 
 
A fundamental consideration for the Green movement was the extent to which they 
should formalise their structures in response to collective framing along republican 
lines. Should they should pursue their aims as Greens parties, or remain 
campaigning outside of the formal politics altogether?  Eventually, akin to Green 
movements in the West, Soviet Greens often sought to operate both within and 
outside of the electoral system simultaneously (Fisher 1990; Parkin 1990). 
As a result, explicit and formal Green parties existed in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine before the collapse of the USSR. In March 1990, 
Greens came to hold seven seats in the Estonian parliament and eight in its 
Supreme Council. The Estonian green movement had emerged in the late 1980’s out 
of local environmental protests and became the focus of anti-communist activists and 
the fight for independence. As part of a nationalist front, they emphasised the need to 
protect the Baltic Sea and opposed phosphorus mining in the North of Estonia 
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(Ziegler 1991: 115).   Their success as a formal Party saw their entry into the 
National Government in 1990 - the Supreme Council elected the first non-communist 
government in April 1990 with the Chairman of the Estonian Greens, Toomas Frey, 
was elected to the position of Environment Minister (Rüdig 2002: 1).  Similarly, six 
Greens were elected to the Latvian parliament and nine in Lithuania (Green 1990).  
In Ukraine, the leadership of Zelenyi Svit originally supported the idea that its Green 
Party, founded in 1990, would operate in conjunction with the Communist Party and 
that the would espouse no ideological doctrine (Marples 1991: 142).  There had 
existed concerns that over-formalisation could result in the displacement of the 
movement’s initial motivations (See Kriesi: 156). In working inside and outside of 
political structures, Zelenyi Svit maximised its success and in 1991, the National 
Government invited Shcherbak to become Environment Minister (Rüdig 2002: 2). 
Unlike the first competitive elections in 1989, the 1990 election campaigns saw 
movement groups campaign more actively for electoral success (Butterfield and 
Sedatis 1991: 2).  The first set of elections had shaken off previous cynicism 
regarding Gorbachev’s commitment to democracy.  Between December 1989 and 
1991, until the collapse of the USSR, the successful trend continued in elections run 
at republic and municipality levels as ties between local environmental activists and 
the electing demos grew stronger (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 6).  According to 
predications, Soviet Green parties underachieved in the elections of spring 1990, 
though as French (1990: 33) acknowledges, this was largely due to the success of 
the movement – virtually all competing parties promised increased environmental 
protection.  Environmentalist positions became extremely popular with Soviet voters, 
irrespective of whether they were endorsed formally by environmental organisations 
(Ziegler 1991: 127). 
The widespread defeat of key nomenklatura candidates (in Leningrad the Communist 
Party First Secretary who was also a member of the Politburo, ran without opposition 
and still lost) marked the increasing inability of Communist elites to attract popular 
support, underlining the increased opportunities for Green candidates.  
Environmental groups realised through their electoral success the vulnerability of the 
Communist Party elite, and the potency of winning elections in furthering their aims.  
Competitive elections proved a magnificent political opportunity, which gave rise to 
more coordinated and professional Green movements that became electoral 
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machines, as well as popular lobbying groups (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 6).   By 
introducing glasnost, perestroika and demokratizatsiia early in his time of leadership, 
Gorbachev rapidly induced participation from an initially sceptical population.  Millions 
harboured deep-rooted grievances regarding environmental concerns, and the 
elections of 1989 and 1990 saw a measured rise in Green movement activity and 
mobilisation, threatening the status quo.  As a result, by the fifth anniversary of 
perestroika in mid-1990, one its main characteristics had been the development of a 
widespread and varied environmental movement both inside and outside of the 
electoral system (ibid.).  
 
3.3 The importance of political opportunities to the Green movement 
 
There is no doubt that social movements are affected by their political environment, 
none more so than the Green movement in the Soviet Union where political 
opportunities were emerging for the first time.  It can be argued, that given the 
sociological context the provision of political opportunities was a crucial factor, both 
objectively in providing such opportunities and subjectively in providing incentives for 
mobilisation in local contexts.  
 
Political opportunity environments provide both the possibility for movements to arise 
and indicate the likelihood for success (Kitschelt 1986: 63).  The number of political 
parties and groups that can effectively articulate different demands influences the 
openness of a political environment; the larger the number of such groups, the more 
‘centrifugal’ a political system is, making it more difficult for elites to monopolise 
decision making power.  For almost 70 years, the Soviet Union was the antithesis of 
such an open environment and only the fundamental restructuring of Soviet society 
could break the Communist Party’s monopoly on power; such centralisation of power 
had prevented any form of Green movement from emerging until the late 1980’s.  
 
The changing political opportunity structure in the Soviet Union had four central 
effects on the Green movement in the 1980’s   Firstly, the increasingly open political 
environment of glasnost provided the political opportunity for environmental 
movements to both emerge and gain momentum.  Specifically, openness increased 
the capacity for Green groups to form without reprisal, organise protests, publish 
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articles, propose policy and, ultimately run for election.  Secondly, regarding 
implementation, the success of social movements in achieving their goals is, at least 
to some degree, shaped by the ability for a legislature to coordinate policies and 
mediate with the executive (ibid.).  The constitutional changes implemented by 
Gorbachev, where policies could be properly discussed in the Congress of People’s 
Deputies and Supreme Soviet by non-Communist Party politicians, represented 
increased opportunity for successful implementation of desirable environmental 
policies.  Gorbachev’s abandonment of the river’s diversion scheme is an example of 
how such increased openness gave rise to greater influence for the environmental 
movement (French 1990: 30).  Thirdly, the level of central government control over 
resources and political decision-making defined the extent to which government 
hegemony could be challenged by the Green movement, along with the level of 
repression.  Though the government provided few specific resources to scientists, 
intelligentsia and citizens to lobby for environmental interests, it certainly did not 
prevent the use of its official statistics or state-owned media in lobbying for such 
improvements, and in this sense, opportunities were provided for environmentalists 
to utilise resources for the first time.  Finally, political opportunities are also affected 
by the influence of the judiciary and secret services, particularly concerning the 
resolution of political conflicts that often emerge from social movements.  Again, an 
increased tolerance of civil unrest, protesting and striking furthered the room to 
manoeuvre that the Green movement had to mobilise the increased environmental 
consciousness that was enveloping Soviet society. The opportunities provided by 
competitive elections and greater openness allowed the Green movement to develop 
in its organisational complexity and increase the sophistication of its tactics 
(Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 2).  Therefore, it can be seen that the possibility for 
emergence of the Green movement can be explained by the fundamental changes 
initiated throughout Soviet society under Gorbachev.    
 
From the perspective of the Communists reformers, the era of glasnost had more far 
reaching consequences than was originally intended, exemplified by the collapse of 
the Soviet Union itself (Tarrow 1994: 74).  Indeed, the spiralling levels of 
environmental protest in the USSR represented not simply increasing opportunities 
for grass roots Green movements, but also opportunities for nationalist elites who 
would seek to harness the power of movements for their own ends.    
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However, structural analysis alone has limitations in identifying the causation of the 
Soviet Green movement (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 76-77); analysis of political 
opportunity structures explains only how a movement can emerge and not 
specifically why it emerges.   Therefore, more detailed analysis is required of the 
reasons for environmental grievances to emerge in the first place, and the role such 
grievances played in fuelling an environmentalist.  Whilst early collective activity had 
taken emotional, demonstrative forms of protest, by the end of the 1980’s the 
experience and interactions of Green activists had led to them becoming more 
organised and successful.   Regional Green movements increasingly developed their 
own distinct platforms, publications, spokespeople and coordinated to support 
candidates for office.  As such, different Green groups were able to share and 
disseminate information, tactics and experiences in response to increased 
opportunity (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 2).  Therefore, the role of 
micromobilisation, resource mobilisation and collective consciousness framing must 
also be considered.  
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4. The origins and construction of the Soviet Green movement 
 
Though liberated by the structural shifts of the 1980’s, the identification of changing 
opportunity structures alone does not explain the inherent demands for the 
emergence of thousands of environmental groups, nor why the Soviet Green 
movement, “attracted supporters from virtually every nationality, age group, and 
socio-economic category” (Ziegler 1991: 113).  Soviet environmental groups were 
diverse in their goals, structures and tactics, rendering it difficult to make 
generalisations about them (French 1990: 31; Ziegler 1991: 125); some sought to 
preserve cultural and natural heritage, whilst others some wished to realign the 
USSR to a truly Marxist direction that was not to the detriment of the environment 
(See, for example, Bahro 1984).  The Soviet Green movement was a juxtaposition of 
a number of environmental groups often interlaced with other movements.  It can 
also be noted that many groups were not driven by a political ideology, but rather 
scientific data or informal empirical observations (McAdam et al., 1988: 711).  
However, a common goal uniting Green groups was to educate the population about 
the environmental ills of the current system and rectify the degradation that was 
proving detrimental to the country’s health and eco-system (French 1990: 31; Ziegler 
1991: 125). 
 
Conventionally, “Green” politics is regarded as being centred around four ‘pillars’: 
environmental sustainability, social justice, direct democracy and peace (for detailed 
analysis see Wall 2005).  I will seek to analyse the Soviet Green movement on its 
own terms, which generally encompassed notions of all of these principles, though 
primarily was concerned with environmental issues.  The Soviet Green movement 
often worked synergistically with nationalist movements that sought subsidiarity and 
democracy, and with labour and women’s movements, which campaigned for social 
justice.  
 
4.1 Historical context of environmental grievances 
 
Though the aforementioned structural transformations provided the opportunities for 
environmental concerns to be collectively voiced for the first time, the roots of the 
movement ran deeper (French 1990: 30).  The Soviet Union had made early 
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contributions to environmentalist thought, in particular adopting the perspective of the 
Russian philosopher Vernadsky, who developed the concept of a world divided into a 
biosphere and the ‘noosphere’ – the aspect of nature under the influence of human 
activity (2006).  Soviet officials publicly, if not practically, supported Vernadsky’s 
warning that without care, human activities would damage the natural world 
irreparably (See Yanshin, 1988; Altshuler and Mnatsakanyan, 1988; French 1990).  
Following the Russian Revolution, several environmentalists had attempted to 
integrate an ecological consciousness into the ephemeral government of the 
Bolsheviks (Ziegler 1987: 49; Gare 1996).  However, whilst environmentalists were 
prominent in the early years of Communist rule, particularly amongst the Left 
Opposition, they came under increasing attack in the 1930’s by Stalin, who saw the 
natural world as subordinate to human kind, to be exploited to expedite the 
industrialisation required to outpace the capitalist West (Kelley, Stunkel and Wescott 
1976: 223; DeFronzo 1996: 49).  As such, the potential leaders of an ephemeral 
Soviet Green movement were silenced, sent to work camps and executed (See 
Powell 1989). 
   
During the 1960’s, a vibrant student movement concerned with nature protection 
developed at Moscow State University, fighting for greater protection of nature 
preserves and biodiversity.  The group encompassed a degree of direct action, but 
was tolerated provided it focussed only on nature reserves and did not broaden 
criticisms to Soviet economic and industrial policy (French 1990: 30).  In the same 
decade, a group of scientists and intellectuals began a campaign to save Lake Baikal 
after a polluting pulp and paper mill was constructed on the shoreline.  Later, in the 
1980’s, a similar group coalesced to prevent a project that would have reversed the 
direction of Siberian rivers to supply water to arid Soviet Central Asia (ibid.).  Indeed, 
working within the auspices of technocracy and bureaucracy, the intelligentsia 
achieved a major success in persuading the Gorbachev to cancel the river diversion 
scheme (Soviet Economy 1988).  Such early examples of environmental protest 
highlight that environmental concerns existed before the age of glasnost, but also 
that before that period, there was no possibility for collective mobilisation, mass 
demonstrations or the use of the media to facilitate collective consciousness.  In the 
words of Russian environmentalist Natalya Yourina, “In the sixties, only individuals 
protested […] a movement didn’t exist” (French 1990: 30). 
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4.2 The Development of an Environmental Consciousness 
 
The period of the late 1980’s gave rise to a widespread environmental movement 
across all segments of society.  In nearly all of the Soviet republics, citizens began to 
protest as never before regarding environmental issues (French 1990: 30).  
Increasingly, tens of thousands of Soviet citizens turned out to protest against the 
building of nuclear power stations, sites of air and water pollution, beach closures 
and various other aspects of environmental degradation (Marples 1996: 127-133; 
Darst 1990; Sheehy and Voronitsyn 1988).  This would have not have occurred if a 
growing collective environmental consciousness had not spread across the USSR. 
 
Like other social movements that emerged under glasnost and perestroika, the 
grievances that drove the Green movement were longstanding and deep-rooted 
(Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 3).  However, unlike other movements, the 
environment was an issue that had received little public attention during the 
Brezhnev era (ibid.: 4).   As empirical and scientific realisation of the extent of 
environmental degradation came to be realised, Soviet citizens, scientists and 
intelligentsia increasingly demanded environmental protection measures to be 
implemented.  In fuelling environmental concerns, the “gap between words and 
deeds,” with regards to the broken promises by the Communist Party elite, angered 
the population into mobilising (Digest of the Soviet Press, May 22 1985: 8). 
 
The role of individual empirical experience in shaping collective consciousness 
proved extremely important and ecological concerns served as a rallying point for 
voluntary political participation.  Concern regarding the pollution of air, water and soil, 
as well as radiation sickness, mobilised Soviet citizens who would otherwise have 
remained politically inactive (Ziegler 1991: 113).  Through the 1970’s and 1980’s, the 
Soviet population became increasingly concerned about the state of their 
environment as it became apparent that pollution was not only affecting their health, 
but also of their off-spring, with evidence of genetic mutation and birth defects 
increasingly documented (Marples 1991: 134; Ziegler 1991: 113).  For example, in 
Donetsk, a mining town, citizens suffered lung cancer incidence 300 times the Soviet 
average, whilst the incidence of genetic abnormalities in Siberian babies was 
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noticeably increasing (Komarov 1978: ii). Under glasnost, Pravda and other Soviet 
news agencies were reporting in explicit detail the nature of smog, radiation and 
chemical pollution, highlighting how they posed significant health risks (Ziegler 1991: 
116).  The collective disenchantment regarding environmental degradation that was 
to erupt into social movement activity was in the most part not unique to Gorbachev’s 
leadership (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 11).  Widespread industrialisation, and the 
ensuing environmental problems, had become starkly obvious to Soviet citizens by 
the 1980’s by which time, at an individual level at least, many Soviet citizens had 
long harboured environmental grievances.  Public concern regarding the environment 
reached a zenith by 1987.  Even according to official statistics, 83.5 per cent of the 
population were either “very strongly” or “rather strongly” disturbed with the state of 
the environment of the Soviet Union (USSR State Committee for the Protection of 
Nature 1988).  Whereas in the West, academics credited higher levels of 
environmental consciousness with higher levels of education amongst certain strata 
of the population (See Inglehart 1971), in the Soviet Union, such was the dire state of 
the environment for most people, ecological problems were self-evident.   
 
The intelligentsia across the Eastern bloc had long highlighted the incompatibility of 
socialism in practice with that of socialism of theory, both on human and ecological 
grounds (Weiner 1999: 437; Mandel 1989: 82; Goldman 1972: 18-22). Such a 
critique is most profound in the work of the East German, Rudolph Bahro, who 
analysed the Stalinist model in these terms and advocated ecological and social 
change from a Marxist perspective (Bahro 1977; 1984).  Environmentalism in the 
USSR was not automatically associated with a perceived inherent flaw in the ideal of 
socialism.  In keeping with the interpretation of Bahro (but not necessarily because of 
him), many Greens saw themselves nominally as communists as well, but 
environmental concerns became increasingly paramount.   
 
According to Snow and Benford (1988), when individual frames of consciousness 
become congruent with those of others, ‘frame alignment’ occurs - the formation of a 
collective identity that is the basis of a collective consciousness (198; Snow et al. 
1986: 464).  Whilst collective frame alignment over large regions may only have been 
possible publicly after the advent of glasnost, the pre-existing individual and micro-
level environmental consciousness of Soviet citizens provided the crucial foundations 
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for collective identities, enhancing the ability for the Green movement to mobilise 
participants. 
For its opponents, environmental abuses served as an obvious indictment of the 
Communist Party’s claim that its economic planning benefited all Soviet citizens 
(Ziegler 1991: 113).  Even by 1978, some 10 per cent of the inhabitable land of the 
Soviet Union was biologically dead (Komarov 1978:131).  Just 30 per cent of Soviet 
sewage was adequately treated whilst pesticides made 30 per cent of the food chain 
dangerous to human health (McCuen 1993: 14).  The rapacious effect on the 
environment, induced by industrialisation and centralised decision-making, served as 
a uniting frame of reference for those across the political spectrum who wished to 
see decision making localised.  Moscow’s environmental polices had proved 
ineffective in solving the problems that industrialisation had caused.  Towards the 
end of the 1980’s, even the regime’s most loyal supporters increasingly questioned 
its dogmatic approach to economic growth at any cost.  In Ukraine, the emergence of 
Zelenyi Svit was testimony to the fact that the Moscow-based State Nature 
committee was not fulfilling its role to consider local concerns (Marples 1991: 138).  
Such concerns manifested themselves on the second anniversary of Chernobyl, 
where a demonstration brought over 10,000 people onto the streets of Kiev (ibid.: 
139).  Meanwhile, a committee set up jointly by the Central Committee and Council of 
Ministers to monitor the environment openly criticised governmental practices of 
myopic ‘departmentalism’ – putting short-term economic priorities above those of 
long term environmental sustainability (See Komarov 1989). 
In keeping with framing and social constructivist theories, such policy failure served 
to exacerbate social grievances (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 283).  Environmental 
damage led to increased political participation as Moscow’s failure to remedy it 
emphasised the lack of control that individuals had over their lives in the USSR 
(Ziegler 1991: 116).  The failure of the Soviet regime to address environmental 
problems, demonstrated how a centralised, bureaucratic system proved incapable of 
harbouring the flexibility and responsiveness to deal effectively with such issues 
(ibid.: 113).  Increasingly, Soviet citizens mobilised behind common interests and 
identities, demanding and threatening widespread social change. 
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4.3 Chernobyl: The amplification of framing processes 
 
No single event served to fuel environmental consciousness across the Soviet Union, 
nor indeed the world, more than the Chernobyl disaster of April 1986 (Petryna 2002: 
1; Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 11).  The political impact of Chernobyl reverberated 
across the USSR, as it did across the world (Turner 2001: 165; Ziegler 1991: 116).  
Sociologically, the event provided frame amplification for the Green movement in 
clarifying and invigorating existing ecological concerns which bridged the movement 
across the USSR (See Snow et al. 1986: 469 for elaboration on frame amplification 
and bridging). 
 
For example, there had long existed public concern regarding the levels of pollution 
in Ukraine’s rivers (Marples 1991: 164; Radianska Ukraina 1989).  By 1987, as a 
result of the frame amplification and micromobilisation after Chernobyl, Ukrainians 
wrote letters, articles and petitions, demonstrating  against plans to divert Ukrainian 
rivers and build a new complex of canals (Sotsialisticheskaia industria 1985; 
Tvarynnytstvo Ukrainy 1985).  By 1988, anti-nuclear protests throughout the Green 
movement had become not only evident in Ukraine, but across the Soviet Union 
(Marples 1988; Marples 1991: 134). Notably, groups utilised scarce resources to 
oppose the building of nuclear power stations in the Crimea, halting Moscow’s 
proposals in 1989 (Nauka I Suspil’stvo: 1989: 30-31).   
 
Simultaneously, Moscow’s secretive response to Chernobyl exemplified to Soviet 
citizens that even under glasnost and perestroika their system was not so open that 
they could trust their government to disclose facts to safeguard their health (Gould 
1991: 61; Marples 1986: 124; Medvedev 1993).  When it became realised that 
thousands of citizens had not been evacuated who should have been in the wake of 
Chernobyl, and that there had been a delay in evacuating those in the 30km 
exclusion zone in the first instance, this served to amplify collective consciousness 
further (Medvedev 1990: 151; Marples 1988: 114-115).  It was because of the 
dishonesty of the Soviet government that the Ukrainian Green movement in particular 
became so strong in response (Stewart 1990: 4; Marples 1991: 134).   The credibility 
gap served both to amplify frames of reference across the Green movement, but to 
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also bridge them with other movements, namely nationalist movements (Snow et al. 
1986: 467; Marples 1991: 137). 
 
4.4 The role of “Environmental Nationalism” 
  
Environmental activism was one social movement relatively tolerated, perhaps as 
Communist elites did not regard it as serious “politics” (Weiner 1999: 429).  However, 
the impact of Soviet industrialisation on the eco-system became linked to nationalist 
movements throughout the Soviet Union.  The legacy of central economic planning 
and environmental degradation were concerns of both Green and nationalist 
movements which had flourished as a result of greater political opportunities (Ziegler 
1991: 117).  Indeed, many of the ethnic minority populations that existed within the 
Soviet Union, felt that Moscow has exploited resources and destroyed eco-systems 
in an almost colonial fashion (ibid.: 114).  Even Communist Party representatives 
condemned the “colonial exploitation” of Siberia’s natural resources and pollution of 
its water supplies (Izvestiaa 1990: 3).  Nationalist Armenian intelligentsia publicly 
denounced the Soviet regime for waging an “ecological genocide” against their 
people.  Not only were national groups increasingly intolerant of risks to their health 
and environment, but they were distrustful of centralised decision makers and their 
ambivalence to environmental protection (FBIS Daily Report, February 2 1990).  For 
example, Ruthenian and Magyar residents of the Transcarpathian region launched a 
protest movement in 1990 against a radar station, which was found to be nuclear 
powered, despite official claims that it was to be a pasta factory (Ziegler 1991: 114).  
Upon the mobilisation of both movements occurred in the late 1980’s, it be came 
increasingly clear to both that their respective grievances against Moscow tessellated 
 
In those republics most politically centrifugal of Moscow, such as the Baltic states, 
the environmental movement could be seen to adopt the most nationalist overtones 
(French 1990: 31).  In Estonia, nationalist sentiments had been historically strong 
and environmentalists tended to side with the nationalist movement in order to utilise 
resources and maximise electoral success (Report on the State of the Environment 
in the USSR 1988; Ziegler 1991).  The national front movements in Belarus and 
Azerbaijan also incorporated heavy reference to environmental protection in their 
platforms to attract Green activists (Ziegler 1991: 115).  Therefore, environmentalism 
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and nationalism were able to bridge their relative frames of reference, given that 
there existed “a linkage of [these] two [...] ideologically congruent […] frames 
regarding a particular issue or problem" (Snow et al. 1986: 467).  As such, many 
environmentalists became pre-occupied with independence politics and saw 
sovereign autonomy as a route by which environmental protection could be ensured 
(See Marples 1990; Green 1990). 
 
Specific ecological commonalties can also be identified between those 
environmentalist movements that were most significantly infused with nationalism. 
Environmental problems relating to agriculture proved particularly controversial and 
stirred nationalist sentiments (Ziegler 1991: 117). In Moldova, Miscarea verzilor, was 
founded in 1988, responding to concerns regarding the use of pesticides and air and 
water pollution (Socor 1989; Ziegler 1991: 114-115).  Whilst the Soviet average for 
using pesticides was 0.5 to 1.0 kilograms per hectare, in Moldova the average was 
20.6 kilograms or higher (Ziegler 1991: 115; Wolfson 1989;). Illness afflicted 
thousands of agricultural workers each year due to handling pesticides, whilst 
Moldovan children were found to suffer lower intelligence levels as result of chemical 
consumption (Singural 1989; Ziegler 1991: 115).  Romanian nationalists seized on 
such abuses in order to further their cause. 
 
It can be argued that the main theoretical commonality that environmentalism and 
nationalism share is that both emerge in industrialised societies.  As Gellner argued, 
agrarian society tends not to be favourable to nationalistic principles, rather “the age 
of transition to industrialism was bound, according to our model, also to be an age of 
nationalism” (1983: 40).  Meanwhile, Hobsbawm’s (1990) analysis is more cynical in 
positing the notion that elites manipulate nationhood in order to maintain political 
control of territory.  Such an analysis is certainly applicable to the Soviet Union, 
where nationalist elites sought to unite emergent social movements under the 
umbrella of independence, and at the same time constructed a ‘proto-nationalism’,  
Such empirical observation supports the idea that, “nations are more often the 
consequence of setting up a state than they are its foundations” (ibid.: 78) 
 
However, not all environmental groups in the USSR succumbed to nationalist 
influence. The pan-Soviet Social-Ecological Union emerged as an umbrella group of 
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more than 150 non-governmental organisations in 260 cities and towns, most notably 
campaigning for the successful abandonment of plans to divert the River Volga 
(Weiner 1999: 433; French 1990: 31; Ziegler 1991: 115). Other such national 
coordinating bodies that represented the Green movement included the Association 
for the Support of Ecological Initiatives, the Ecological Union, Ecology and Peace, 
and the appropriately named Green Movement (French 1990: 31).  Many 
environmental groups were based in cities or dedicated to specific environmental 
causes.  For example, Episentr was an umbrella organisation based in Leningrad 
(now St. Petersburg) which united, smaller, localised groups to successfully oppose 
construction of dams across the Gulf of Finland and secured policies to clear up 
Leningrad’s polluted water supply (Ziegler 1991: 115; Posev 1987: 30-40).  In 
response to the environmental nationalism in other republics, Russian nationalists 
accredited blame for Russia’s ecological ills to selfish and corrupt bureaucrats who 
had squandered national wealth in the pursuit of individual gain (Ziegler 1991: 122; 
Green 1990; Keller 1990; Petro 1990).  Therefore, whilst nationalism became a 
prominent feature of the Soviet Green movement, it was not a primary cause of its 
emergence, rather a vehicle through which collective interests were expressed and 
resources mobilised.   
 
4.5 Collective agency and resource mobilisation 
 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, it has been identified, particularly through 
extensive work on social movements in the West, that formation of social movements 
is often facilitated by the existence of prior organisations of collective action (see 
Tilly, 1978, 62 -3; Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 7; McAdam 1996:15).  The role that 
these pre-existing social organisations played in the Soviet Union was as 
“transmissions belts from the state to society” (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 7). 
Whereas the existence of a totalitarian infrastructure historically stifled the 
environmental movement in terms of opportunity, it at the same time facilitated the 
notion of coalescing collective and personal interests to achieve political ends in the 
minds of Soviet citizens.  The importance of mass mobilisation was a crucial premise 
of totalitarian government for the Communist Party, indeed it is arguably its critical 
element (see Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956).  It was the collective responsibility of 
totalitarian infrastructure not only to channel collective action, but to contain it as well 
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(Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 6).  Before the ascendance of Gorbachev, 
environmental activists were forced to operate inside the state apparatus.  As such, 
group activity amongst specialists was an important aspect of policy-making but 
environmental concerns were manipulated to serve wider ideological goals until 
alternative political opportunities arose under glasnost (Ziegler 1991: 114). 
 
A factor in the success of social movements is the ability to facilitate and mobilise a 
potential membership and negotiate the existent political opportunity structure 
(McAdam 1996: 339).  The more relaxed political climate and environmental 
disasters such as Chernobyl, as well as general environmental degradation provided 
the raison d'être for the emergence of hundreds of environmental groups across the 
USSR (Ziegler 1991: 114).  Tarrow emphasises the importance of the emergent 
phase of a social movement in sustaining collective action (Tarrow 1988: 7).  
Therefore, whilst perhaps not primary to the causation of the Green movement, the 
action pursued through collective agency responding to the political opportunity 
structure and wider political environment remains relevant. 
 
The leaders of the movement tended to be well educated, yet the movement’s 
success was arguably due to its broad appeal and the fundamental, materialist 
nature of environmental grievances (Butterfield and Sedatis 1991: 7).  The 
introduction of competitive elections heightened the relative advantage of such a 
broad appeal vis-à-vis other movements, but at the same time imposed a formal 
organisation structure with which the movement was required to negotiate.  
Therefore, the introduction of competitive elections saw environmental groups 
develop into more professional, bureaucratic structures in order to maximise 
successful outcomes (ibid.).  Such a desire to engage with the electoral system often 
came from the membership, rather than leadership figures. For example in Ukraine, 
grass roots members of Zelenyi Svit drove the reclassification of the group as a 
political party, contrasting against the leadership’s more cautious approach (Marples 
1988). It could certainly be seen that personal interests were satiated by the 
collective direction of the Green movement, with regards to psycho-sociological and 
rational choice perspectives (see Dunleavy 1991).  However, the nature of 
organisation varied from group to group, and in terms of comprising the movement as 
a whole, collective agency appears to be a secondary causal factor behind the 
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emergence of the Soviet Green movement when compared to the role of political 
opportunities and the emergence of a collective environmental consciousness and 
grievances. 
 
The obstacles that a movement faces, both externally and internally, provides at least 
some importance on its ability to mobilise resources (Tarrow 1998: 106; Snow et al. 
1986: 472).  The foundation of the Lake Baikal Protection Society in 1987 lends 
some support for theorists who cite resource mobilisation as being pertinent to the 
emergence of the Green movement (Trass 1984: 43-49; Galazii 1984).  Their 
successful opposition to the building of a 70km pipeline to pump factory waste into 
one of the lake’s tributaries was partly due to that by mid-1990, the Fund had raised 
600,000 rubles to support the Lake’s preservation (Massey 1990: 58-62).  The highly 
successful Estonian and Latvian Greens also harnessed financial resources to 
maximise press and television coverage, again suggesting that resource mobilisation 
was important (Izvestiia 1990: 3). Resource mobilisation theorists tend to regard 
formalisation as requisite for a social movement and emphasise the ability for it to 
mobilise and coordinate resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977).  However, whilst 
resources and pooled collaboration proved important, it appears the developing 
environmental consciousness and political opportunity structure proved most vital in 
bringing the Russian, Estonian and Latvian Green movements to life.  Many other 
Green groups had little in terms of resources but were equally successful.  For 
example, in Ukraine, Zelenyi Svit, utilised scarce resources to successfully halt 
Moscow’s plans to build a nuclear power station in Crimea in 1989.  Therefore, whilst 
resource mobilisation certainly aided the Green movement, it was more a catalyst to 
consolidation and success, rather than direct cause for the emergence in the first 
instance.  
 
The internal agency of a movement and its ability to mobilise resources, can be seen 
merely as part of the process of adapting to the structural context, and as a 
consequence of framing processes (Kriesi 1996: 157).  In addition, focussing on the 
primacy of agency and resources does not acknowledge that movements are 
primarily rooted in, and driven by, their structural contexts.  Without changes to the 
political opportunity structure, the emergence of a Green movement would not have 
been possible.  Similarly, without objective reasons for the development of 
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environmentalist consciousness, and the micromobilisation context within which 
framing and collective consciousness is facilitated, then resource mobilisation and 
the role of collective agency would be moot.  Whilst the role of collective agency and 
resource mobilisation are certainly important in the analysis of specific successes of 
various environmental groups, they do not provide an explanation for the emergence 
of the Soviet Green movement as a whole (Kendall 2006). 
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6. Conclusions 
 
In the West, it has often been argued that the emergence of Green social movements 
was as a result of the growth of post-materialist values in wealthy societies and 
increased levels of education, most famously advocated by Inglehart (See Inglehart 
1971; 2000; Inglehart et. al. 2004).  However, in the Soviet Union the emergence of 
Green politics was rooted to a materialist discourse; chronic environmental 
degradation and catastrophe was increasingly noticeable, and noticeably affecting 
the health of citizens, amid relative material deprivation (Ziegler 1991: 128).  
Therefore, the post-materialist thesis cannot be used to explain the emergence of the 
Green social movement in the Soviet Union. The emergence of the Soviet Green 
movement was instead fuelled by factors that can be explained through the use of 
traditional social movement theories. 
 
This dissertation first identified how the changing political opportunity structure 
facilitated the growth of the Green movement.  However, a structural analysis alone 
does not explain why inherent grievances that existed; rather it explains how groups 
came to emerge.  Therefore, accrediting the framing processes involved in the 
emergence of environmental consciousness proves essential in understanding the 
causation for the social construction of the Green movement.   
 
Where Soviet scientists and theorists had previously attempted to raise awareness of 
ecologically damaging economic practices, they lacked the political freedom to 
mobilise public opinion against Soviet policies.  As such, the advent of glasnost, 
perestroika and demokratizatsiia provided political opportunities for the first time and 
proved to be the lifeblood of the Soviet Green movement.  Glasnost and 
democratisation made the Soviet system more open, tolerant and centrifugal, thus it 
became far more difficult for central government to impose nuclear power stations, 
toxic waste dumps and polluting industrial plants in the wake of Green mobilisation 
(ibid.: 129). 
 
From its emergence, the Green movement engaged with existing social structures 
according to its own resources and agency.  However, identification of such factors, 
given wide disparities, did not play any fundamental part in the causation of the 
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emergence of the Green movement prima facie.  Therefore, the internal dynamics of 
the Green social movement, in this instance, prove secondary factors.  Further study 
could investigate the relative importance of comparative mobilisation of resources 
and agency between Green groups in different Soviet republics. 
 
Social movements are not simply a side effect of rapid social change.  It is true that 
opening political opportunities served to facilitate an environmentalist consciousness, 
but this would not have developed if it had not been for the environmental 
degradation rife throughout Soviet society that formed major grievances for Soviet 
citizens and local communities.  Whilst Gorbachev’s reforms had opened a 
‘Pandora’s Box’ of political opportunity, chronic pollution became self-evident to 
Soviet citizens, developing not only an ecological consciousness, but also a 
collective desire mobilise a wide-ranging and prominent Green movement as 
witnessed throughout the late 1980’s. 
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